Intellectual trust in oneself and others / Richard Foley.
Material type: TextSeries: Cambridge studies in philosophyPublication details: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001.Description: x, 182 p. ; 24 cmISBN:- 0521793084
- 121/.6 21
- BD161 .F565 2001
Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
General Books | CUTN Central Library Generalia | 121/.6 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 9683 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Machine generated contents note: - The Importance of Intellectual Self-Trust -- 1. Classical foundationalism and intellectual trust -- 2. Attempts to refiute skepticism -- 3. Externalism and the analysis of knowledge -- 4. Epistemology, theology, and natural selection -- 5. Epistemology and the leap of intellectual faith -- 2 Intellectual Self-Trust, Rational Belief, and Invulnerability -- to Self-Criticism -- 1. Confidence and depth -- 2. Rational belief as invulnerability to self-criticism -- 3. Two thought experiments -- 4. Self-trust and inconsistency -- 5. Rationality and less than ideal outcomes -- t:Empirical Challenges to Self-Trust -- 1. Studies documenting our tendencies to make errors -- 2. First-person epistemological issues raised by the -- ,studies -- I: 3. Self-monitoring -- E 4. The limits of self-monitoring -- 5. The lack of guarantees -- 6. Internal conflict and conflict with others -- Part Two Intellectual Trust in Others and in One's Own -- Future and Past Self -- 4 Self-Trust and the Authority of Others -- 1. Epistemic egotism and epistemic egoism -- 2. Locke on the authority of others -- 3. The social construction of opinion -- 4. The incoherence of epistemic egotism and egoism -- 5. Intellectual conflict with others -- 6. Anonymous reconsidered -- 7. Egalitarianism and expert opinion -- 8. Individualism and autonomy -- 5 Past Opinion and Current Opinion -- 1. The diary problem -- 2. Three theses about past opinion -- 3. An attempt to motivate the credibility thesis -- 4. The incoherence of not trusting past opinion -- 5. Differences in the credibility of past opinions -- 6. The priority thesis and the special reason thesis -- 7. Radical conflicts with one's own past opinions -- 8. Past opinions and the opinions of others -- 6 Future Opinion and Current Opinion -- 1. Epistemic Ulysses problems -- 2. Trust in future opinion -- 3. Reasons for believing that I will believe P -- 4. Conflicts between current and future opinions -- 5. Future opinions and current deliberations -- 6. Self-trust radiates outward -- Conclusion -- Index.
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