000			03562cam a2200397 i 4500
001			19282
003			CUTN
005			20150707150443.0
008			120626s2013 enka b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2012025995
020			_a9781107013728
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda _dDLC
042			_apcc
043			_an-us---
050	0	0	_aHG2563 _b.O75 2013
082	0	0	_a332.1/10973 _223
084			_aBUS027000 _2bisacsh
245	0	4	_aThe origins, history, and future of the Federal Reserve : _ba return to Jekyll Island / _cedited by Michael D. Bordo, Rutgers University, New Jersey; William Roberds, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
300			_axix 431 pages : _bIllustrations ; _c25 cm.
490	0		_aStudies in macroeconomic history
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_a"This book contains essays presented at a conference held in November 2010 to mark the centenary of the famous 1910 Jekyll Island meeting of leading American financiers and the U.S. Treasury. The 1910 meeting resulted in the Aldrich Plan, a precursor to the Federal Reserve Act that was enacted by Congress in 1913. The 2010 conference, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and Rutgers University, featured assessments of the Fed's near 100-year track record by prominent economic historians and macroeconomists. The final chapter of the book records a panel discussion of Fed policy making by the current and former senior Federal Reserve officials. ch1: "To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking:" How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision Abstract Although bank supervision under the National Banking System exercised a light hand and panics were frequent, depositor losses were minimal. Double liability induced shareholders to carefully monitor bank managers and voluntarily liquidate banks early if they appeared to be in trouble. Inducing more disclosure, marking assets to market, and ensuring prompt closure of insolvent national banks, the Comptroller of the Currency reinforced market discipline. The arrival of the Federal Reserve weakened this regime. Monetary policy decisions conflicted with the goal of financial stability and created moral hazard. The appearance of the Fed as an additional supervisor led to more "competition in laxity" among regulators and "regulatory arbitrage" by banks. When the Great Depression hit, policy-induced deflation and asset price volatility were misdiagnosed as failures of competition and market valuation. In response, the New Deal shifted to a regime of discretion-based supervision with forbearance"--
610	2	0	_aBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
650		0	_aFederal reserve banks _xHistory.
650		0	_aBanks and banking, Central _zUnited States _xHistory.
650		0	_aMonetary policy _zUnited States _xHistory.
650		7	_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Finance. _2bisacsh
700	1		_aBordo, Michael D., _eeditor of compilation.
700	1		_aRoberds, William, _eeditor of compilation.
856	4	2	_3Contributor biographical information _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1312/2012025995-b.html
856	4	2	_3Publisher description _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1312/2012025995-d.html
856	4	1	_3Table of contents only _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1312/2012025995-t.html
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBOOKS
999			_c15360 _d15360