The philosophy of metacognition :
Proust, Joëlle,
The philosophy of metacognition : mental agency and self-awareness / Joëlle Proust. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. - vii, 366 pages : illustrations (black and white) ; 24 cm
Originally published: 2013. Formerly CIP.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Introduction 2. An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition 3. Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views 4. Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism 5. Primate metacognition 6. A representational format for procedural metacognition 7. Mental acts as natural kinds 8. The norms of acceptance 9. Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view 10. Is there a sense of agency for thought? 11. The sense of self as the same 12. Experience of agency in schizophrenia 13. Conversational metacognition 14. Dual-system metacognition and new challenges
Does metacognition - the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance - derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations and is essentially related to mental agency.
9780198748175
Metacognition
Cognitive Psychology.
Cognitive Science.--Philosophy.
153 / PRO
The philosophy of metacognition : mental agency and self-awareness / Joëlle Proust. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. - vii, 366 pages : illustrations (black and white) ; 24 cm
Originally published: 2013. Formerly CIP.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Introduction 2. An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition 3. Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views 4. Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism 5. Primate metacognition 6. A representational format for procedural metacognition 7. Mental acts as natural kinds 8. The norms of acceptance 9. Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view 10. Is there a sense of agency for thought? 11. The sense of self as the same 12. Experience of agency in schizophrenia 13. Conversational metacognition 14. Dual-system metacognition and new challenges
Does metacognition - the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance - derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations and is essentially related to mental agency.
9780198748175
Metacognition
Cognitive Psychology.
Cognitive Science.--Philosophy.
153 / PRO