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Buy Game Theory And Mechanism Design / Y. Narahari.

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publication details: Bangalore : IISc Press, 2014.Description: XL, 492 Pages : Diagramme. 2022ISBN:
  • 9780000988706
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 23 519.3 NAR
Contents:
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction; Non-Cooperative Games: Extensive Form Games; Strategic Form Games; Theory of Utilities; Dominant Strategy Equilibria; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; Rationalizability; Computation of Nash Equilibria; Matrix Games; Bayesian Games; Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Evolutionary Game Theory; Repeated Games; Mechanism Design: The Mechanism Design Environment; Examples of Social Choice Functions; Implementation of Social Choice Functions; Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem; Properties of Social Choice Functions; Key Impossibility Theorems; The Quasi-Linear Environment; Groves Mechanisms; Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms; Examples of VCG Mechanisms; Bayesian Mechanisms; Revenue Equivalence Theorem; Myerson Optimal Auction; Further Topics in Mechanism Design; Cooperative Game Theory: Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium; The Two Person Bargaining Problem; Games in Characteristic Form; The Core; The Shapley Value; Other Solution Concepts; Bargaining as an Extensive Form Game; To Probe Further.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode
General Books General Books CUTN Central Library Sciences Non-fiction 519.3 NAR (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 47807

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction; Non-Cooperative Games: Extensive Form Games; Strategic Form Games; Theory of Utilities; Dominant Strategy Equilibria; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; Rationalizability; Computation of Nash Equilibria; Matrix Games; Bayesian Games; Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Evolutionary Game Theory; Repeated Games; Mechanism Design: The Mechanism Design Environment; Examples of Social Choice Functions; Implementation of Social Choice Functions; Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem; Properties of Social Choice Functions; Key Impossibility Theorems; The Quasi-Linear Environment; Groves Mechanisms; Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms; Examples of VCG Mechanisms; Bayesian Mechanisms; Revenue Equivalence Theorem; Myerson Optimal Auction; Further Topics in Mechanism Design; Cooperative Game Theory: Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium; The Two Person Bargaining Problem; Games in Characteristic Form; The Core; The Shapley Value; Other Solution Concepts; Bargaining as an Extensive Form Game; To Probe Further.

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