The developing mind : a philosophical introduction / Stephen Butterfill.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Preface
1 Introduction
1.1 Two breakthroughs
1.2 Knowledge
1.3 A crude picture of the mind
1.4 Core knowledge
1.5 Two stories
1.6 Development is rediscovery
Notes
PART I: Physical objects
2 Principles of object perception
2.1 Knowledge of objects involves three abilities
2.2 Segmentation
2.3 Principles of object perception
2.4 Conclusion
Notes
3 The Simple View
3.1 The Simple View
3.2 Persistence
3.3 Extending the Simple View to persistence
3.4 Causal interactions
3.5 The case for the Simple View
Notes
4 The Linking Problem
4.1 Against the Simple View
4.2 Further evidence against the Simple View
4.3 Things get even worse for the Simple View
4.4 The Linking Problem
4.5 Representation not knowledge
4.6 Graded representations?
4.7 Conclusion
Notes
5 Core knowledge
5.1 What is core knowledge?
5.2 Can core knowledge solve the Linking Problem?
5.3 How not to define something
5.4 Will invoking modularity help?
5.5 Conclusion
Notes
6 Object indexes and motor representations of objects
6.1 Object indexes in adult humans
6.2 Object indexes and the principles of object perception
6.3 The CLSTX Conjecture
6.4 Signature limits
6.5 Knowledge or core knowledge or …?
6.6 Against the CLSTX Conjecture
6.7 Motor representations of objects
6.8 Conjecture O
6.9 Conclusion: paradox lost
Notes
7 Metacognitive feelings
7.1 Objection to Conjecture O
7.2 Metacognitive feelings: a first example
7.3 More metacognitive feelings
7.4 What is a metacognitive feeling?
7.5 A metacognitive feeling of surprise?
7.6 Conjecture Om
7.7 Metacognitive feelings are intentional isolators
7.8 Conclusion
Notes
8 Conclusion to Part I
8.1 What is an expectation?
8.2 Core knowledge: a lighter account
8.3 Development is rediscovery
8.4 How does rediscovery occur?
Interlude on innateness
9 Innateness
9.1 Syntax
9.2 A poverty of stimulus argument
9.3 The poverty of poverty of stimulus arguments
9.4 Is core knowledge innate?
9.5 Syntax and rediscovery
9.6 Conclusion
Notes
PART II: Minds and actions
10 Action
10.1 Tracking vs knowing
10.2 Three-month-olds track the goals of actions
10.3 Pure goal tracking
10.4 The Teleological Stance
10.5 Statistical regularities
10.6 A methodological explanation?
10.7 A second puzzle: acting and tracking
10.8 Conclusion
Notes
11 A theory of goal tracking
11.1 The Simple View
11.2 The Motor Theory of Goal Tracking
11.3 The Motor Theory and the Teleological Stance
11.4 Target vs goal
11.5 A dual process theory of goal tracking
11.6 Puzzles solved?
11.7 Conclusion
Notes
12 Mind: the puzzle
12.1 All about Maxi
12.2 Infants track false beliefs
12.3 A replication challenge
12.4 Methodological defects or truly contradictory responses?
12.5 Models
12.6 The Mindreading Puzzle
Notes
13 Three levels of analysis
13.1 Tracking beliefs without representing them?
13.2 Altercentric interference
13.3 Mirroring beliefs?
13.4 Three levels of analysis
13.5 Task analysis
13.6 Selection and inhibition
13.7 Too much mindreading?
13.8 What now?
Notes
14 Mind: a solution?
14.1 Mindreading is sometimes automatic
14.2 Mindreading is not always automatic
14.3 A dual process theory of mindreading
14.4 Speed-accuracy trade-offs
14.5 What is a model of minds and actions?
14.6 Minimal models of the mental
14.7 Signature limits in mindreading
14.8 A developmental theory of mindreading
14.9 How to solve the Mindreading Puzzle
14.10 Task analysis revisited
14.11 Is there core knowledge of minds?
14.12 Origins of knowledge of mind: rediscovery
Notes
15 Joint action
15.1 Joint action vs parallel but merely individual actions
15.2 Shared intention
15.3 Bratman on shared intention
15.4 An inconsistent triad
15.5 Coordinating planning
15.6 Joint action in the first years of life
15.7 Collective goals vs shared intentions
15.8 Expectations about collective goals
15.9 Conclusion
Notes
16 Conclusion to Part II
16.1 Dual process theories
16.2 Pluralism about models
16.3 Goal tracking is the foundation
16.4 When joint action enables goal tracking
16.5 Joint action and the developmental emergence of knowledge
Note
17 Conclusion
17.1 Infants rely on minimal models ...
17.2 … As do adults, sometimes
17.3 Puzzles matter
17.4 Linking problems abound
17.5 Core knowledge isn’t what you think it is
17.6 How to solve linking problems
17.7 Representation: handle with care
17.8 Inferential and intentional isolation
17.9 Rediscovery is joint action
Notes
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

"The development of children's minds raises fundamental questions, from how we are able to know about basic aspects of the world such as objects and actions to how we come to grasp mental states. The Developing Mind is the first book to critically introduce and examine philosophical questions concerning children's cognitive development and considers the implications of scientific breakthroughs for the philosophy of developmental psychology. The book explores central topics in developmental psychology from a philosophical perspective : children's awareness of objects and the question of 'object permanence' the nature and explanatory role of 'core knowledge' evidence for innate drivers of language children's knowledge of the relation between actions and goals puzzles about when infants first have awareness of other minds how social interaction explains the emergence of knowledge Throughout the book, Stephen Butterfill draws on important case studies, including experiments with children on objects and their interactions, 'false belief tasks', and the process by which children come to see other people, not just themselves, as purposive agents. He shows how these questions can illuminate fundamental debates in philosophy of mind concerning the mind's architecture, the explanatory power of representation, the social character of knowledge, and the nature of metacognitive feelings. Additional features, such as a glossary and extensive bibliographic references, provide helpful tools for those coming to the subject for the first time"--