MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
14092cam a2200373 a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
CUTN |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20240909160523.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
100211s2011 nyu b 001 0 eng |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
9780415879224 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
0415879221 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
9780415879231 (pbk.) |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
9781138283732(pbk.) |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
9780203846469 (ebook) |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
020384646X (ebook) |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language |
English |
| 082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
121 |
| Edition number |
22 |
| Item number |
AUD |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Audi, Robert, |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Epistemology : |
| Remainder of title |
a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge / |
| Statement of responsibility, etc |
Robert Audi. |
| 250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT |
|---|
| Edition statement |
3rd ed. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
New York : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc |
Routledge, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc |
2011. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
xix, 404 p. ; |
| Dimensions |
25 cm. |
| 505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Title |
Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy<br/>Contents<br/>Preface to the first edition<br/>Acknowledgments to the first edition<br/>Preface to the second edition<br/>Acknowledgments to the second edition<br/>Preface to the third edition<br/>Acknowledgments to the third edition<br/>Introduction<br/>Perception, belief, and justification<br/>Justification as process, as status, and as property<br/>Knowledge and justification<br/>Memory, introspection, and self-consciousness<br/>Reason and rational reflection<br/>Testimony<br/>Basic sources of belief, justification, and knowledge<br/>Three kinds of grounds of belief<br/>Fallibility and skepticism<br/>Overview<br/>Part One Sources of justification, knowledge, and truth<br/>1 Perception<br/>The elements and basic kinds of perception<br/>Perceptual belief<br/>Perception, conception, and belief<br/>Propositional and objectual perception<br/>Seeing and believing<br/>Perceptually embedded beliefs<br/>Perception as a source of potential beliefs<br/>The perceptual hierarchy<br/>Simple, objectual, and propositional perception<br/>The informational character of perception<br/>Perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge<br/>Seeing and seeing as<br/>Perceptual content<br/>Seeing as and perceptual grounds of justification<br/>Seeing as a ground of perceptual knowledge<br/>Notes<br/>2 Theories of perception<br/>Some commonsense views of perception<br/>Perception as a causal relation and its four main elements<br/>Illusion and hallucination<br/>The theory of appearing<br/>Sense-datum theories of perception<br/>The argument from hallucination<br/>Sense-datum theory as an indirect, representative realism<br/>Appraisal of the sense-datum approach<br/>Adverbial theories of perception<br/>Adverbial and sense-datum theories of sensory experience<br/>Phenomenalism<br/>A sense-datum version of phenomenalism<br/>Adverbial phenomenalism<br/>Appraisal of phenomenalism<br/>Perception and the senses<br/>Indirect seeing and delayed perception<br/>Sight and light<br/>Vision and the eyes<br/>Notes<br/>3 Memory<br/>Memory and the past<br/>The causal basis of memory beliefs<br/>Theories of memory<br/>Three modes of memory<br/>The direct realist view<br/>The representative theory of memory<br/>Memory images<br/>Remembering<br/>The phenomenalist conception of memory<br/>The adverbial conception of memory<br/>Remembering, recalling, and imaging<br/>Remembering, imaging, and recognition<br/>The epistemological centrality of memory<br/>Remembering, knowing, and being justified<br/>Memorial justification and memorial knowledge<br/>Memory as a retentional and generative source<br/>Notes<br/>4 Consciousness<br/>Two basic kinds of mental properties<br/>Introspection and inward vision<br/>Some theories of introspective consciousness<br/>Realism about the objects of introspection<br/>An adverbial view of introspected objects<br/>The analogy between introspection and ordinary perception<br/>Introspective beliefs, beliefs about introspectables, and fallibility<br/>Consciousness and privileged access<br/>Infallibility, omniscience, and privileged access<br/>Difficulties for the thesis of privileged access<br/>The possibility of scientific grounds for rejecting privileged access<br/>Introspective consciousness as a source of justification and knowledge<br/>The range of introspective knowledge and justification<br/>The defeasibility of introspective justification<br/>Consciousness as a basic source<br/>Notes<br/>5 Reason I<br/>Self-evident truths of reason<br/>The concept of self-evidence<br/>Two types of immediacy<br/>The classical view of the truths of reason<br/>Analytic propositions<br/>Necessary propositions<br/>The analytic, the a priori, and the synthetic<br/>Three types of a priori propositions<br/>The empirical<br/>Analytic truth, concept acquisition, and necessity<br/>The empiricist view of the truths of reason<br/>Rationalism and empiricism<br/>Empiricism and the genesis and confirmation of arithmetic beliefs<br/>Empiricism and logical and analytic truths<br/>Notes<br/>6 Reason II<br/>The conventionalist view of the truths of reason<br/>Truth by definition and truth by virtue of meaning<br/>Knowledge through definitions versus truth by definition<br/>Conventions as grounds for interpretation<br/>Some difficulties and strengths of the classical view<br/>Vagueness<br/>Meaning change and falsification<br/>The possibility of empirical necessary truth<br/>Essential and necessary truths<br/>Necessity, apriority, and provability<br/>Reason, experience, and a priori justification<br/>A priori beliefs<br/>Loose and strict senses of ‘a priori justification’ and ‘a priori knowledge’<br/>The power of reason and the possibility of indefeasible justification<br/>Notes<br/>7 Testimony<br/>The nature of testimony: formal and informal<br/>The psychology of testimony<br/>The inferentialist view of testimony<br/>Inferential grounds versus constraints on belief-formation<br/>The direct source view of testimony<br/>Testimony as a source of basic belief<br/>The epistemology of testimony<br/>Knowledge and justification as products of testimony<br/>Testimony and memory compared<br/>The twofold epistemic dependence of testimony<br/>The indispensability of testimonial grounds<br/>Conceptual versus propositional learning<br/>Testimony as a primeval source of knowledge and justification<br/>Non-testimonial support for testimony-based beliefs<br/>Notes<br/>Part Two The structure and growth of justification and knowledge<br/>8 Inference and the extension of knowledge<br/>The process, content, and structure of inference<br/>Two related senses of ‘inference’<br/>Reasoned belief and belief for a reason<br/>Two ways beliefs may be inferential<br/>The basing relation: direct and indirect belief<br/>Inference and the growth of knowledge<br/>Confirmatory versus generative inferences<br/>Inference as a dependent source of justification and knowledge<br/>Inference as an extender of justification and knowledge<br/>Source conditions and transmission conditions for inferential knowledge and justification<br/>Deductive and inductive inference<br/>Subsumptive and analogical inference<br/>The inferential transmission of justification and knowledge<br/>Inductive transmission and probabilistic inference<br/>Some inferential transmission principles<br/>Deductive transmission of justification and knowledge<br/>Degrees and kinds of deductive transmission<br/>Memorial preservation of inferential justification and inferential knowledge<br/>Notes<br/>9 The architecture of knowledge<br/>Inferential chains and the structure of belief<br/>Infinite inferential chains<br/>Circular inferential chains<br/>The epistemic regress problem<br/>Infinite epistemic chains<br/>Circular epistemic chains<br/>Epistemic chains terminating in belief not constituting knowledge<br/>Epistemic chains terminating in knowledge<br/>The epistemic regress argument<br/>Foundationalism and coherentism<br/>Holistic coherentism<br/>Patterns of justification<br/>A coherentist response to the regress argument<br/>The nature of coherence<br/>Coherence and explanation<br/>Coherence as an internal relation among cognitions<br/>Coherence, reason, and experience<br/>Coherence and the a priori<br/>Coherence and the mutually explanatory<br/>Epistemological versus conceptual coherentism<br/>Coherence, incoherence, and defeasibility<br/>Positive and negative epistemic dependence<br/>Coherence and second-order justification<br/>The process versus the property of justification<br/>Beliefs, dispositions to believe, and grounds of belief<br/>Justification, knowledge, and artificially created coherence<br/>Moderate foundationalism<br/>The role of coherence in moderate foundationalism<br/>Moderate foundationalism and the charge of dogmatism<br/>Notes<br/>Part Three The nature and scope of justification and knowledge<br/>10 The analysis of knowledge<br/>Knowledge and justified true belief<br/>Knowledge conceived as the right kind of justified true belief<br/>Dependence on falsehood as an epistemic defeater of justification<br/>Knowledge and certainty<br/>Knowing and knowing for certain<br/>Knowing and making certain<br/>Naturalistic accounts of the concept of knowledge<br/>Knowledge as appropriately caused true belief<br/>Knowledge as reliably grounded true belief<br/>Reliable grounding and a priori knowledge<br/>Problems for reliability theories<br/>The specification problem<br/>Reliability and defeat<br/>Reliability, relevant alternatives, and luck<br/>Relevant alternatives and epistemological contextualism<br/>Notes<br/>11 Knowledge, justification, and truth<br/>Knowledge and justification<br/>The apparent possibility of clairvoyant knowledge<br/>Natural knowledge<br/>Internalism and externalism in epistemology<br/>Some varieties of internalism and externalism<br/>The overall contrast between internalism and externalism<br/>Internalist and externalist versions of virtue epistemology<br/>Some apparent problems for virtue epistemology<br/>The internality of justification and the externality of knowledge<br/>Justification, knowledge, and truth<br/>The value problem<br/>Why is knowledge preferable to merely true belief?<br/>The value of knowledge compared with that of justified true belief<br/>Theories of truth<br/>The correspondence theory of truth<br/>Minimalist and redundancy accounts of truth<br/>The coherence theory of truth<br/>The pragmatic theory of truth<br/>Concluding proposals<br/>Notes<br/>12 Scientific, moral, and religious knowledge<br/>Scientific knowledge<br/>The focus and grounding of scientific knowledge<br/>Scientific imagination and inference to the best explanation<br/>The role of deduction in scientific practice<br/>Fallibilism and approximation in science<br/>Scientific knowledge and social epistemology<br/>Social knowledge and the idea of a scientific community<br/>Moral knowledge<br/>Relativism and noncognitivism<br/>Preliminary appraisal of relativist and noncognitivist views<br/>Moral versus “factual” beliefs<br/>Ethical intuitionism<br/>Kantian rationalism in moral epistemology<br/>Utilitarian empiricism in moral epistemology<br/>Kantian and utilitarian moral epistemologies compared<br/>Religious knowledge<br/>Evidentialism versus experientialism<br/>The perceptual analogy and the possibility of direct theistic knowledge<br/>Problems confronting the experientialist approach<br/>Justification and rationality, faith and reason<br/>Acceptance, presumption, and faith<br/>Notes<br/>13 Skepticism I<br/>The possibility of pervasive error<br/>Perfectly realistic hallucination<br/>Two competing epistemic ideals: believing truth and avoiding falsehood<br/>Some dimensions and varieties of skepticism<br/>Skepticism generalized<br/>Skepticism about direct knowledge and justification<br/>Inferential knowledge and justification: the problem of induction<br/>The problem of other minds<br/>The egocentric predicament<br/>Fallibility<br/>Three kinds of infallibility<br/>Knowledge and fallibility<br/>Uncertainty<br/>Knowing, knowing for certain, and telling for certain<br/>Entailment as a requirement for inferential justification<br/>Knowing and showing<br/>Notes<br/>14 Skepticism II<br/>Negative versus positive defenses of common sense<br/>Deducibility, evidential transmission, and induction<br/>Epistemic and logical possibility<br/>Entailment, certainty, and fallibility<br/>The authority of knowledge and the cogency of its grounds<br/>Epistemic authority and cogent grounds<br/>Grounds of knowledge as conferring epistemic authority<br/>Exhibiting knowledge versus dogmatically claiming it<br/>Refutation and rebuttal<br/>Prospects for a positive defense of common sense<br/>A case for justified belief<br/>The regress of demonstration<br/>A case for knowledge<br/>A circularity problem<br/>The challenge of rational disagreement<br/>Intellectual pluralism<br/>Epistemic parity<br/>Dogmatism, fallibilism, and intellectual courage<br/>Skepticism and common sense<br/>Notes<br/>15 Conclusion<br/>Short annotated bibliography of books in epistemology<br/>Index |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
Epistemology, or “the theory of knowledge,” is concerned with how we know what we know, what justifies us in believing what we believe, and what standards of evidence we should use in seeking truths about the world and human experience. This comprehensive introduction to the field of epistemology explains the concepts and theories central to understanding knowledge. Along with covering the traditional topics of the discipline in detail, Epistemology explores emerging areas of research. The third edition features new sections on such topics as the nature of intuition, the skeptical challenge of rational disagreement, and “the value problem” – the range of questions concerning why knowledge and justified true belief have value beyond that of merely true belief. Updated and expanded, Epistemology remains a superb introduction to one of the most fundamental fields of philosophy. Special features of the third edition of Epistemology include: a comprehensive survey of basic concepts, major theories, and emerging research in the field enhanced treatment of key topics such as contextualism, perception (including perceptual content), scientific hypotheses, self-evidence and the a priori, testimony, understanding, and virtue epistemology expanded discussion of the relation between epistemology and related fields, especially philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and ethics increased clarity and ease of understanding for an undergraduate audience an updated list of key literature and annotated bibliography. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Knowledge, Theory of. |
| 856 42 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
<a href="http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1114/2010005139-b.html">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1114/2010005139-b.html</a> |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Koha item type |
General Books |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Dates associated with a name |
1941- |
| 490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT |
|---|
| Series statement |
Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
|---|
| Bibliography, etc |
Includes bibliographical references (p. [389]-398) and index. |
| 830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE |
|---|
| Uniform title |
Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy. |
| 856 42 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Materials specified |
Contributor biographical information |
| 906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
|---|
| a |
7 |
| b |
cbc |
| c |
orignew |
| d |
1 |
| e |
ecip |
| f |
20 |
| g |
y-gencatlg |
