Epistemology : a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge / Robert Audi.

By:

Material type: Text

TextLanguage: English Series: Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophyPublication details: New York : Routledge, 2011.Edition: 3rd edDescription: xix, 404 p. ; 25 cmISBN:

9780415879224
0415879221
9780415879231 (pbk.)
9781138283732(pbk.)
9780203846469 (ebook)
020384646X (ebook)

Subject(s):

Knowledge, Theory of

DDC classification:

121 22 AUD

Online resources:

Contents:

Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Contents Preface to the first edition Acknowledgments to the first edition Preface to the second edition Acknowledgments to the second edition Preface to the third edition Acknowledgments to the third edition Introduction Perception, belief, and justification Justification as process, as status, and as property Knowledge and justification Memory, introspection, and self-consciousness Reason and rational reflection Testimony Basic sources of belief, justification, and knowledge Three kinds of grounds of belief Fallibility and skepticism Overview Part One Sources of justification, knowledge, and truth 1 Perception The elements and basic kinds of perception Perceptual belief Perception, conception, and belief Propositional and objectual perception Seeing and believing Perceptually embedded beliefs Perception as a source of potential beliefs The perceptual hierarchy Simple, objectual, and propositional perception The informational character of perception Perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge Seeing and seeing as Perceptual content Seeing as and perceptual grounds of justification Seeing as a ground of perceptual knowledge Notes 2 Theories of perception Some commonsense views of perception Perception as a causal relation and its four main elements Illusion and hallucination The theory of appearing Sense-datum theories of perception The argument from hallucination Sense-datum theory as an indirect, representative realism Appraisal of the sense-datum approach Adverbial theories of perception Adverbial and sense-datum theories of sensory experience Phenomenalism A sense-datum version of phenomenalism Adverbial phenomenalism Appraisal of phenomenalism Perception and the senses Indirect seeing and delayed perception Sight and light Vision and the eyes Notes 3 Memory Memory and the past The causal basis of memory beliefs Theories of memory Three modes of memory The direct realist view The representative theory of memory Memory images Remembering The phenomenalist conception of memory The adverbial conception of memory Remembering, recalling, and imaging Remembering, imaging, and recognition The epistemological centrality of memory Remembering, knowing, and being justified Memorial justification and memorial knowledge Memory as a retentional and generative source Notes 4 Consciousness Two basic kinds of mental properties Introspection and inward vision Some theories of introspective consciousness Realism about the objects of introspection An adverbial view of introspected objects The analogy between introspection and ordinary perception Introspective beliefs, beliefs about introspectables, and fallibility Consciousness and privileged access Infallibility, omniscience, and privileged access Difficulties for the thesis of privileged access The possibility of scientific grounds for rejecting privileged access Introspective consciousness as a source of justification and knowledge The range of introspective knowledge and justification The defeasibility of introspective justification Consciousness as a basic source Notes 5 Reason I Self-evident truths of reason The concept of self-evidence Two types of immediacy The classical view of the truths of reason Analytic propositions Necessary propositions The analytic, the a priori, and the synthetic Three types of a priori propositions The empirical Analytic truth, concept acquisition, and necessity The empiricist view of the truths of reason Rationalism and empiricism Empiricism and the genesis and confirmation of arithmetic beliefs Empiricism and logical and analytic truths Notes 6 Reason II The conventionalist view of the truths of reason Truth by definition and truth by virtue of meaning Knowledge through definitions versus truth by definition Conventions as grounds for interpretation Some difficulties and strengths of the classical view Vagueness Meaning change and falsification The possibility of empirical necessary truth Essential and necessary truths Necessity, apriority, and provability Reason, experience, and a priori justification A priori beliefs Loose and strict senses of ‘a priori justification’ and ‘a priori knowledge’ The power of reason and the possibility of indefeasible justification Notes 7 Testimony The nature of testimony: formal and informal The psychology of testimony The inferentialist view of testimony Inferential grounds versus constraints on belief-formation The direct source view of testimony Testimony as a source of basic belief The epistemology of testimony Knowledge and justification as products of testimony Testimony and memory compared The twofold epistemic dependence of testimony The indispensability of testimonial grounds Conceptual versus propositional learning Testimony as a primeval source of knowledge and justification Non-testimonial support for testimony-based beliefs Notes Part Two The structure and growth of justification and knowledge 8 Inference and the extension of knowledge The process, content, and structure of inference Two related senses of ‘inference’ Reasoned belief and belief for a reason Two ways beliefs may be inferential The basing relation: direct and indirect belief Inference and the growth of knowledge Confirmatory versus generative inferences Inference as a dependent source of justification and knowledge Inference as an extender of justification and knowledge Source conditions and transmission conditions for inferential knowledge and justification Deductive and inductive inference Subsumptive and analogical inference The inferential transmission of justification and knowledge Inductive transmission and probabilistic inference Some inferential transmission principles Deductive transmission of justification and knowledge Degrees and kinds of deductive transmission Memorial preservation of inferential justification and inferential knowledge Notes 9 The architecture of knowledge Inferential chains and the structure of belief Infinite inferential chains Circular inferential chains The epistemic regress problem Infinite epistemic chains Circular epistemic chains Epistemic chains terminating in belief not constituting knowledge Epistemic chains terminating in knowledge The epistemic regress argument Foundationalism and coherentism Holistic coherentism Patterns of justification A coherentist response to the regress argument The nature of coherence Coherence and explanation Coherence as an internal relation among cognitions Coherence, reason, and experience Coherence and the a priori Coherence and the mutually explanatory Epistemological versus conceptual coherentism Coherence, incoherence, and defeasibility Positive and negative epistemic dependence Coherence and second-order justification The process versus the property of justification Beliefs, dispositions to believe, and grounds of belief Justification, knowledge, and artificially created coherence Moderate foundationalism The role of coherence in moderate foundationalism Moderate foundationalism and the charge of dogmatism Notes Part Three The nature and scope of justification and knowledge 10 The analysis of knowledge Knowledge and justified true belief Knowledge conceived as the right kind of justified true belief Dependence on falsehood as an epistemic defeater of justification Knowledge and certainty Knowing and knowing for certain Knowing and making certain Naturalistic accounts of the concept of knowledge Knowledge as appropriately caused true belief Knowledge as reliably grounded true belief Reliable grounding and a priori knowledge Problems for reliability theories The specification problem Reliability and defeat Reliability, relevant alternatives, and luck Relevant alternatives and epistemological contextualism Notes 11 Knowledge, justification, and truth Knowledge and justification The apparent possibility of clairvoyant knowledge Natural knowledge Internalism and externalism in epistemology Some varieties of internalism and externalism The overall contrast between internalism and externalism Internalist and externalist versions of virtue epistemology Some apparent problems for virtue epistemology The internality of justification and the externality of knowledge Justification, knowledge, and truth The value problem Why is knowledge preferable to merely true belief? The value of knowledge compared with that of justified true belief Theories of truth The correspondence theory of truth Minimalist and redundancy accounts of truth The coherence theory of truth The pragmatic theory of truth Concluding proposals Notes 12 Scientific, moral, and religious knowledge Scientific knowledge The focus and grounding of scientific knowledge Scientific imagination and inference to the best explanation The role of deduction in scientific practice Fallibilism and approximation in science Scientific knowledge and social epistemology Social knowledge and the idea of a scientific community Moral knowledge Relativism and noncognitivism Preliminary appraisal of relativist and noncognitivist views Moral versus “factual” beliefs Ethical intuitionism Kantian rationalism in moral epistemology Utilitarian empiricism in moral epistemology Kantian and utilitarian moral epistemologies compared Religious knowledge Evidentialism versus experientialism The perceptual analogy and the possibility of direct theistic knowledge Problems confronting the experientialist approach Justification and rationality, faith and reason Acceptance, presumption, and faith Notes 13 Skepticism I The possibility of pervasive error Perfectly realistic hallucination Two competing epistemic ideals: believing truth and avoiding falsehood Some dimensions and varieties of skepticism Skepticism generalized Skepticism about direct knowledge and justification Inferential knowledge and justification: the problem of induction The problem of other minds The egocentric predicament Fallibility Three kinds of infallibility Knowledge and fallibility Uncertainty Knowing, knowing for certain, and telling for certain Entailment as a requirement for inferential justification Knowing and showing Notes 14 Skepticism II Negative versus positive defenses of common sense Deducibility, evidential transmission, and induction Epistemic and logical possibility Entailment, certainty, and fallibility The authority of knowledge and the cogency of its grounds Epistemic authority and cogent grounds Grounds of knowledge as conferring epistemic authority Exhibiting knowledge versus dogmatically claiming it Refutation and rebuttal Prospects for a positive defense of common sense A case for justified belief The regress of demonstration A case for knowledge A circularity problem The challenge of rational disagreement Intellectual pluralism Epistemic parity Dogmatism, fallibilism, and intellectual courage Skepticism and common sense Notes 15 Conclusion Short annotated bibliography of books in epistemology Index

Summary: Epistemology, or “the theory of knowledge,” is concerned with how we know what we know, what justifies us in believing what we believe, and what standards of evidence we should use in seeking truths about the world and human experience. This comprehensive introduction to the field of epistemology explains the concepts and theories central to understanding knowledge. Along with covering the traditional topics of the discipline in detail, Epistemology explores emerging areas of research. The third edition features new sections on such topics as the nature of intuition, the skeptical challenge of rational disagreement, and “the value problem” – the range of questions concerning why knowledge and justified true belief have value beyond that of merely true belief. Updated and expanded, Epistemology remains a superb introduction to one of the most fundamental fields of philosophy. Special features of the third edition of Epistemology include: a comprehensive survey of basic concepts, major theories, and emerging research in the field enhanced treatment of key topics such as contextualism, perception (including perceptual content), scientific hypotheses, self-evidence and the a priori, testimony, understanding, and virtue epistemology expanded discussion of the relation between epistemology and related fields, especially philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and ethics increased clarity and ease of understanding for an undergraduate audience an updated list of key literature and annotated bibliography.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Current library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
General Books	CUTN Central Library Philosophy & psychology	Non-fiction	121 AUD (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		49395

Includes bibliographical references (p. [389]-398) and index.

Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy
Contents
Preface to the first edition
Acknowledgments to the first edition
Preface to the second edition
Acknowledgments to the second edition
Preface to the third edition
Acknowledgments to the third edition
Introduction
Perception, belief, and justification
Justification as process, as status, and as property
Knowledge and justification
Memory, introspection, and self-consciousness
Reason and rational reflection
Testimony
Basic sources of belief, justification, and knowledge
Three kinds of grounds of belief
Fallibility and skepticism
Overview
Part One Sources of justification, knowledge, and truth
1 Perception
The elements and basic kinds of perception
Perceptual belief
Perception, conception, and belief
Propositional and objectual perception
Seeing and believing
Perceptually embedded beliefs
Perception as a source of potential beliefs
The perceptual hierarchy
Simple, objectual, and propositional perception
The informational character of perception
Perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge
Seeing and seeing as
Perceptual content
Seeing as and perceptual grounds of justification
Seeing as a ground of perceptual knowledge
Notes
2 Theories of perception
Some commonsense views of perception
Perception as a causal relation and its four main elements
Illusion and hallucination
The theory of appearing
Sense-datum theories of perception
The argument from hallucination
Sense-datum theory as an indirect, representative realism
Appraisal of the sense-datum approach
Adverbial theories of perception
Adverbial and sense-datum theories of sensory experience
Phenomenalism
A sense-datum version of phenomenalism
Adverbial phenomenalism
Appraisal of phenomenalism
Perception and the senses
Indirect seeing and delayed perception
Sight and light
Vision and the eyes
Notes
3 Memory
Memory and the past
The causal basis of memory beliefs
Theories of memory
Three modes of memory
The direct realist view
The representative theory of memory
Memory images
Remembering
The phenomenalist conception of memory
The adverbial conception of memory
Remembering, recalling, and imaging
Remembering, imaging, and recognition
The epistemological centrality of memory
Remembering, knowing, and being justified
Memorial justification and memorial knowledge
Memory as a retentional and generative source
Notes
4 Consciousness
Two basic kinds of mental properties
Introspection and inward vision
Some theories of introspective consciousness
Realism about the objects of introspection
An adverbial view of introspected objects
The analogy between introspection and ordinary perception
Introspective beliefs, beliefs about introspectables, and fallibility
Consciousness and privileged access
Infallibility, omniscience, and privileged access
Difficulties for the thesis of privileged access
The possibility of scientific grounds for rejecting privileged access
Introspective consciousness as a source of justification and knowledge
The range of introspective knowledge and justification
The defeasibility of introspective justification
Consciousness as a basic source
Notes
5 Reason I
Self-evident truths of reason
The concept of self-evidence
Two types of immediacy
The classical view of the truths of reason
Analytic propositions
Necessary propositions
The analytic, the a priori, and the synthetic
Three types of a priori propositions
The empirical
Analytic truth, concept acquisition, and necessity
The empiricist view of the truths of reason
Rationalism and empiricism
Empiricism and the genesis and confirmation of arithmetic beliefs
Empiricism and logical and analytic truths
Notes
6 Reason II
The conventionalist view of the truths of reason
Truth by definition and truth by virtue of meaning
Knowledge through definitions versus truth by definition
Conventions as grounds for interpretation
Some difficulties and strengths of the classical view
Vagueness
Meaning change and falsification
The possibility of empirical necessary truth
Essential and necessary truths
Necessity, apriority, and provability
Reason, experience, and a priori justification
A priori beliefs
Loose and strict senses of ‘a priori justification’ and ‘a priori knowledge’
The power of reason and the possibility of indefeasible justification
Notes
7 Testimony
The nature of testimony: formal and informal
The psychology of testimony
The inferentialist view of testimony
Inferential grounds versus constraints on belief-formation
The direct source view of testimony
Testimony as a source of basic belief
The epistemology of testimony
Knowledge and justification as products of testimony
Testimony and memory compared
The twofold epistemic dependence of testimony
The indispensability of testimonial grounds
Conceptual versus propositional learning
Testimony as a primeval source of knowledge and justification
Non-testimonial support for testimony-based beliefs
Notes
Part Two The structure and growth of justification and knowledge
8 Inference and the extension of knowledge
The process, content, and structure of inference
Two related senses of ‘inference’
Reasoned belief and belief for a reason
Two ways beliefs may be inferential
The basing relation: direct and indirect belief
Inference and the growth of knowledge
Confirmatory versus generative inferences
Inference as a dependent source of justification and knowledge
Inference as an extender of justification and knowledge
Source conditions and transmission conditions for inferential knowledge and justification
Deductive and inductive inference
Subsumptive and analogical inference
The inferential transmission of justification and knowledge
Inductive transmission and probabilistic inference
Some inferential transmission principles
Deductive transmission of justification and knowledge
Degrees and kinds of deductive transmission
Memorial preservation of inferential justification and inferential knowledge
Notes
9 The architecture of knowledge
Inferential chains and the structure of belief
Infinite inferential chains
Circular inferential chains
The epistemic regress problem
Infinite epistemic chains
Circular epistemic chains
Epistemic chains terminating in belief not constituting knowledge
Epistemic chains terminating in knowledge
The epistemic regress argument
Foundationalism and coherentism
Holistic coherentism
Patterns of justification
A coherentist response to the regress argument
The nature of coherence
Coherence and explanation
Coherence as an internal relation among cognitions
Coherence, reason, and experience
Coherence and the a priori
Coherence and the mutually explanatory
Epistemological versus conceptual coherentism
Coherence, incoherence, and defeasibility
Positive and negative epistemic dependence
Coherence and second-order justification
The process versus the property of justification
Beliefs, dispositions to believe, and grounds of belief
Justification, knowledge, and artificially created coherence
Moderate foundationalism
The role of coherence in moderate foundationalism
Moderate foundationalism and the charge of dogmatism
Notes
Part Three The nature and scope of justification and knowledge
10 The analysis of knowledge
Knowledge and justified true belief
Knowledge conceived as the right kind of justified true belief
Dependence on falsehood as an epistemic defeater of justification
Knowledge and certainty
Knowing and knowing for certain
Knowing and making certain
Naturalistic accounts of the concept of knowledge
Knowledge as appropriately caused true belief
Knowledge as reliably grounded true belief
Reliable grounding and a priori knowledge
Problems for reliability theories
The specification problem
Reliability and defeat
Reliability, relevant alternatives, and luck
Relevant alternatives and epistemological contextualism
Notes
11 Knowledge, justification, and truth
Knowledge and justification
The apparent possibility of clairvoyant knowledge
Natural knowledge
Internalism and externalism in epistemology
Some varieties of internalism and externalism
The overall contrast between internalism and externalism
Internalist and externalist versions of virtue epistemology
Some apparent problems for virtue epistemology
The internality of justification and the externality of knowledge
Justification, knowledge, and truth
The value problem
Why is knowledge preferable to merely true belief?
The value of knowledge compared with that of justified true belief
Theories of truth
The correspondence theory of truth
Minimalist and redundancy accounts of truth
The coherence theory of truth
The pragmatic theory of truth
Concluding proposals
Notes
12 Scientific, moral, and religious knowledge
Scientific knowledge
The focus and grounding of scientific knowledge
Scientific imagination and inference to the best explanation
The role of deduction in scientific practice
Fallibilism and approximation in science
Scientific knowledge and social epistemology
Social knowledge and the idea of a scientific community
Moral knowledge
Relativism and noncognitivism
Preliminary appraisal of relativist and noncognitivist views
Moral versus “factual” beliefs
Ethical intuitionism
Kantian rationalism in moral epistemology
Utilitarian empiricism in moral epistemology
Kantian and utilitarian moral epistemologies compared
Religious knowledge
Evidentialism versus experientialism
The perceptual analogy and the possibility of direct theistic knowledge
Problems confronting the experientialist approach
Justification and rationality, faith and reason
Acceptance, presumption, and faith
Notes
13 Skepticism I
The possibility of pervasive error
Perfectly realistic hallucination
Two competing epistemic ideals: believing truth and avoiding falsehood
Some dimensions and varieties of skepticism
Skepticism generalized
Skepticism about direct knowledge and justification
Inferential knowledge and justification: the problem of induction
The problem of other minds
The egocentric predicament
Fallibility
Three kinds of infallibility
Knowledge and fallibility
Uncertainty
Knowing, knowing for certain, and telling for certain
Entailment as a requirement for inferential justification
Knowing and showing
Notes
14 Skepticism II
Negative versus positive defenses of common sense
Deducibility, evidential transmission, and induction
Epistemic and logical possibility
Entailment, certainty, and fallibility
The authority of knowledge and the cogency of its grounds
Epistemic authority and cogent grounds
Grounds of knowledge as conferring epistemic authority
Exhibiting knowledge versus dogmatically claiming it
Refutation and rebuttal
Prospects for a positive defense of common sense
A case for justified belief
The regress of demonstration
A case for knowledge
A circularity problem
The challenge of rational disagreement
Intellectual pluralism
Epistemic parity
Dogmatism, fallibilism, and intellectual courage
Skepticism and common sense
Notes
15 Conclusion
Short annotated bibliography of books in epistemology
Index

Epistemology, or “the theory of knowledge,” is concerned with how we know what we know, what justifies us in believing what we believe, and what standards of evidence we should use in seeking truths about the world and human experience. This comprehensive introduction to the field of epistemology explains the concepts and theories central to understanding knowledge. Along with covering the traditional topics of the discipline in detail, Epistemology explores emerging areas of research. The third edition features new sections on such topics as the nature of intuition, the skeptical challenge of rational disagreement, and “the value problem” – the range of questions concerning why knowledge and justified true belief have value beyond that of merely true belief. Updated and expanded, Epistemology remains a superb introduction to one of the most fundamental fields of philosophy. Special features of the third edition of Epistemology include: a comprehensive survey of basic concepts, major theories, and emerging research in the field enhanced treatment of key topics such as contextualism, perception (including perceptual content), scientific hypotheses, self-evidence and the a priori, testimony, understanding, and virtue epistemology expanded discussion of the relation between epistemology and related fields, especially philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and ethics increased clarity and ease of understanding for an undergraduate audience an updated list of key literature and annotated bibliography.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.