The philosophy of metacognition : mental agency and self-awareness / Joëlle Proust.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- 9780198748175
- 153 23 PRO
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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CUTN Central Library Philosophy & psychology | Non-fiction | 153 PRO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 33138 |
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Originally published: 2013.
Formerly CIP.
1. Introduction 2. An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition 3. Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views 4. Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism 5. Primate metacognition 6. A representational format for procedural metacognition 7. Mental acts as natural kinds 8. The norms of acceptance 9. Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view 10. Is there a sense of agency for thought? 11. The sense of self as the same 12. Experience of agency in schizophrenia 13. Conversational metacognition 14. Dual-system metacognition and new challenges
Uk
Includes bibliographical references.
Does metacognition - the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance - derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations and is essentially related to mental agency.
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