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The philosophy of metacognition : mental agency and self-awareness / Joëlle Proust.

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publication details: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.Description: vii, 366 pages : illustrations (black and white) ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 9780198748175
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 153 23 PRO
Contents:
1. Introduction 2. An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition 3. Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views 4. Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism 5. Primate metacognition 6. A representational format for procedural metacognition 7. Mental acts as natural kinds 8. The norms of acceptance 9. Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view 10. Is there a sense of agency for thought? 11. The sense of self as the same 12. Experience of agency in schizophrenia 13. Conversational metacognition 14. Dual-system metacognition and new challenges
Summary: Does metacognition - the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance - derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations and is essentially related to mental agency.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode
General Books General Books CUTN Central Library Philosophy & psychology Non-fiction 153 PRO (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 33138

Originally published: 2013.

Formerly CIP.

1. Introduction 2. An evaluativist proposal: cognitive control and metacognition 3. Metacognition as cognition about cognition: attributive views 4. Metacognition or metarepresentation? A critical discussion of attributivism 5. Primate metacognition 6. A representational format for procedural metacognition 7. Mental acts as natural kinds 8. The norms of acceptance 9. Epistemic agency and metacognition: an externalist view 10. Is there a sense of agency for thought? 11. The sense of self as the same 12. Experience of agency in schizophrenia 13. Conversational metacognition 14. Dual-system metacognition and new challenges

Uk

Includes bibliographical references.

Does metacognition - the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance - derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations and is essentially related to mental agency.

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